At a seminar in Brussel on Monday, it became clear that the Commission considers rights-based management in the form of Individual Tradable Quotas (ITQs) as a possible way to achieve fleet capacity reduction in the EU.
On Monday 23 March, a number of NGOs met in Brusselsto discuss rights-based management (RBM) and possible options for the EU in the context of CFP-reform. The seminar was organised by the Pew Environment Group as part of a joint NGO-effort to formulate targets for the upcoming reform of the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy in 2012.
An overview of the current situation was provided by Suzanna Walmsley from Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG) based in London. They have just finished an overview of the current situation on behalf of the European Commission. Today, a range of very variable systems are used across the EU.
It is up to Member States to decide how to allocate the annual catch quota given to each country, based on a combination of the principle of relative stability (divides the fishing opportunities into national quotas through agreed conversion factors based largely on historical records) and the total annual quota set at the Council meetings in October (Baltic Sea stocks) and December (other EU stocks).
This has given rise to a patchwork of different systems, from almost completely open fishing under the national quota, through community turf rights to individually allocated quota that may or may not be tradable. The European Commission has been focusing on this issue for the last couple of years, in order to get a better overview of the current situation and enable an assessment of how this affects the EU policy framework for fisheries.
A first Communication and a stakeholder consultation took place in 2007 (COM(2007)73). Since then, it appears that the Commission has begun to focus more on the potential of using different rights-based management systems in order to bring down the persistent overcapacity in the EU fleet. What both the MRAG study and the Commission’s own conclusions seems to show is that one of the most effective ways to do this through a RBM-system is through Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs).
ITQs have been much hailed and much criticised. There is no doubt that unless the system for setting them up is properly designed, considering issues such as ownership concentration, lease lengths and the characteristics of coastal fisheries for example, they can have a number of adverse effects. It is also true that they can only function within a well-working general management system, providing for long-term sustainability through quotas, technical regulations, control and enforcement.
Brian O’Riordan from the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) provided a different view looking at how RBM systems can be designed to support social objectives, such as employment, distribution of profits and collective solutions in the small-scale sector. Finally, Chris Grieve from Meridian Prime gave some examples of how different systems may favour environmentally sustainable practices.
The NGO discussions following the presentations focused on these last two areas: are there ways to design different RBM systems that will favour environmentally and socially sustainable fisheries, and if so: how can Member States be encouraged to consider these factors when they shape their systems for dividing up the national quota?