Commission examines the use of Rights-based Management
Published: 13/11/2007In February, the European Commission launched a public consultation on the potential use of individual rights to fish. Rights-based Management has already been put into practice in several Member States, but has so far not been included in the European Union fishery management framework. The current consultation is an attempt to examine different management options, aiming to improve the effectiveness and competitiveness of the EU fleet, while improving the status of the fish resources.
Contents:
- Examining new management approach
- Towards Rights-based Management
- Many questions on effects of privatisation
- Winners and losers
- References
1. Examining new management approach
Today, many parts of the Community fishing fleet are in economic difficulties and efficiency is generally low. The status of European fish stocks is also a cause for concern: it is estimated that about 80 per cent of stocks are over-fished and the situation has not improved greatly since the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2002. The European Commission highlights these facts as the reasons for examining a new approach. It also hopes to address the current lack of coherence and transparency with the many different national approaches.
Management systems globally have gone from free access to some form of access and/or use rights system. In the EU, this has been done under the CFP by allocating national quotas and licenses, and to some extent through limiting days at sea and trying to limit fleet capacity. This has not, however, been very effective in meeting the overall targets of the CFP of sustainable fish stocks and a viable, competitive industry. Therefore, with this consultation, the Commission seeks to examine different management options with a view to improve the effectiveness of EU fisheries management overall. It is also an attempt to make Member States more accountable and responsible for their own resources through assigning use rights, which in turn encourage competition.
Contents:
- Examining new management approach
- Towards Rights-based Management
- Many questions on effects of privatisation
- Winners and losers
- References
2. Towards Rights-based Management
Use rights can be defined as the right to use fishery resources, with the aim to restrict who has access to fisheries, to limit the fishing effort allowed and, finally, to regulate the catch (Connecticut Sea Grant, 2007). Use rights are generally distributed by the government and owned (or leased) by the users (individuals, groups, communities, organisations, enterprises, vessels), and are commonly seen as incentives for more sustainable use of, or investments in, the resource itself. But it is important to see that “limiting access alone can fail if the resource users compete for shares, and the resource can become depleted unless incentives or regulations prevent overexploitation” (Ostrom, 1999).
In the Communication (COM(2007)73), the European Commission defines Rights-Based Management (RBM) as “a formalised system of allocating individual fishing rights”. It divides rights-based management into two broad categories: 1) access rights, which include territorial use rights in fishing (TURFs – usually community owned and based on a geographical area) and/or limited entry licences (provide access to specific fisheries); and 2) withdrawal (or harvest) rights, consisting of input rights (regulated through fishing effort such as sea-days, vessel types and gear used) and catch rights (provide catch amounts of a specific species , in principle, expressed as a percentage of the Total Allowable Catch).
The Commission argues that under catch rights, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) may offer the most flexibility within a private ownership system and may reduce the “race to fish”, in addition to creating sustainable access to stocks, encouraging longer fishing seasons, and finally, enabling predictable market conditions which may facilitate long-term effort planning. ITQs may also, however, result in the creation of monopolies, encourage high-grading (COM(2007)73, p.10), and require more effective control and enforcement mechanisms (CFFA, 2007).
Contents:
- Examining new management approach
- Towards Rights-based Management
- Many questions on effects of privatisation
- Winners and losers
- References
3. Many questions on effects of privatisation
The European Commission stresses that even with RBM, the public authority remains in control of determining conditions of access and use of the stocks (CFFA, 2007). According to DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (2007), there is an unregulated system of use rights already, for instance Holland and Denmark have a formalized ITQ system, and there is quota “hopping” between UK and Holland, and quota exchange between Spain and France. But, as is clearly stated in the NGO position document on rights-based management (2007), to date there has been no information indicating best practices within the EU fishing industry. Close examination is necessary to ensure delivery of appropriate reforms and changes to supplement or replace current policies.
The Dutch Fish Product Board (2007) warns of possible negative effects in situations where one RBM system is used in combination with another. Recently, the Dutch fisheries experienced detrimental effects when the EU system limiting sea days under the cod recovery plan (which coincidentally is a rights-based approach) was used in tandem with their national ITQ system. Although the Dutch plan already used a system limiting days at sea to improve the effectiveness of their ITQs, the separate EU directive on allocation of sea days created inefficiency in the national Dutch ITQs since the two allotments did not mutually support each other. The above example brings to light “that making different RBM systems equivalent within one fishery can have precisely the opposite result from that which the Commission intends, namely to bring about economic efficiency” (The Dutch Fish Product Board, 2007, p. 1–2).
According to Symes, the struggle lies “with governments’ content to tinker at the edges, but rarely willing to embrace fundamental reform” (Symes, 2007, pp. 779). He also suggests that it is not necessary to place all nations’ management frameworks within one system, or to implement only one form of use rights. As evident from the Dutch example, two forms of rights-based management can work together if allocations are streamlined. The NGO position document (2007) emphasizes that application of various management systems can be beneficial, and that lack of transparency and inefficiency within any given system is often a result of ineffective implementation rather than diversity of management styles.
Contents:
4. Winners and losers
There are claims that RBM allows for more flexibility and efficiency within the fisheries sector, but experience in other countries shows that it also creates a system of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Because RBM stimulates competition, less efficient vessels have the option of selling or trading their use rights, for example “days at sea” allowances or parts of the quotas, with more efficient vessels to maximize their productivity even more (Hatcher & Frost, 2003, p. 5). So in theory at least, less profitable vessels leave the sector, while the most efficient vessels increase productivity. A market dynamic is created which may decrease overall fleet capacity. Moreover, Hatcher and Frost argue that since use rights can be bought and sold, financial gains received from the sale of such rights would provide compensation for individual fishing units in addition to any other governmental subsidies in place. However, there will always be individuals or groups who will be excluded from getting a piece of the fishing pie.
The Irish Fishermen’s Organisation is adamant that catch rights, and in particular ITQs, quickly lead to a concentration of ownership, a steady decrease of both stocks and fleets, represents a seizure of public resources by individuals and create an irreversible “legal and political one-way street” which is not suitable for the future of EU fisheries (Irish Fishermen’s Organisation, 2007, p.3). The NGOs echo this sentiment in part and add that formalizing a system of tradable quotas is not a solution to the current fisheries crisis. It simply does “not allow the social and environmental shortcomings inherent in the system to be dealt with”. It may, however, be an indirect way to deal with the continuous problem of fleet overcapacity in the EU, especially because subsequent generations of fishing enterprises will have to buy their quotas at market prices, unlike those of the first generation (CFFA, 2007).
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5. References
Commission for Fair Fisheries Arrangements (CFFA) (2007). Commission Consultation on Rights-Based Management tools in fisheries, Brussels, Belgium: http://www.cape-cffa.org/publications.php
Connecticut Sea Grant (2007). Rights Based Fisheries Management [Brochure]: http://www.seagrant.uconn.edu/publ.htm
DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (2007). “Communication by the Commission on rights-based management tools in fisheries”, [Powerpoint presentation]: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/dialog/acfa250407_annex2_fr.pdf
Food and Agricultural Organization (2006): ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0699e/a0699e.pdf
Hatcher, A. & Frost, H. (2003). Discussion Paper: The Introduction of Rights Based Management in Fisheries, University of Portsmouth, UK and Danish Institute of Food Economics, Denmark: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/rbm_paper1.pdf
Jacquet, J. (2007). Silent water: a brief examination of the marine fisheries crisis, Springer Science & Business Media: http://www.springerlink.com/content/b115250864p2364p/
Ostrom, E. et al. (1999). Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science, Vol. 284, pp. 278–282.
Parsons, S. (2005). Ecosystem Considerations in Fisheries Management: Theory and Practice, Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the UN Fish Agreement 2005: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fgc-cgp/documents/parsons_e.pdf
Symes, D. (2007). Fisheries Management and Institutional Reform: a European perspective, ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64, 779–785.
The Dutch Fisheries Board (2007). Letter on Consultation on rights based management tools: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/contributions260207/dutch_fish_product_board_en.pdf.
The Irish Fisherman’s Organisation (2007). Communication. Rights-Based Management: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/contributions260207/ifo_en.pdf
WWF (2007). Position paper: The use of Rights Based Measures in Fisheries Management: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/contributions260207/wwf_en.pdf